Monday, 9 January 2012

Pembunuhan Dr. Joe Fernandez


Pembunuhan

Pada 4 November 2000, kira-kira pukul 1.30 petang, Dr. Joe yang dalam perjalanan pulang ke rumah dan terperangkap dalam kesesakan jalan raya di persimpangan Jalan Maju dan Jalan Harapan dekat Bukit Mertajam . Kejadian berlaku di di Jalan Maju, Bukit Mertajam ketika dalam perjalanan makan di rumahnya di Taman Bukit , Bukit Mertajam , hanya 500 meter dari klinik beliau.

Dua lelaki bermotosikal telah melepaskan tembakan ke atas kenderaan jenis Nissan Terrano yang dipandu oleh Joe Fernandez dan melarikan diri ke arah Sungai Rambai, Lunas , Kedah.Suspek itu dipercayai pembunuh upahan.Dr. Doshinda Singh memberi rawatan kecemasan dan kemudian membawa mendiang ke Hospital Pakar Bukit Mertajam. Pakar patologi, Datuk Dr. Bupinder Singh mengesahkan mendiang meninggal dunia akibat tembakan tepat di kepala dengan pistol jenis .38. [1]

Arah siasatan semula

Pada 25 April 2008, Mahkamah Koroner Bukit Mertajam ,Koroner M. Mageswari mengarahkan polis membuat siasatan lanjut (open verdict) kerana tiada keputusan yang jelas. Ini kerana mahkamah tidak mengesyaki dan menolak kemungkinan Dr. Joe telah dibunuh akibat masalah perniagaan, politik atau perhubungan peribadi si mati dengan mana-mana pihak.

Ahli kimia dan balistik telah mengesahkan bahawa senjata api yang digunakan dalam rompakan Southern Bank, Petaling Jaya dan pembunuhan Dr. Joe Fernandez adalah senjata api yang sama. Seorang suspek kes rompakan di Southern Bank, Petaling Jaya pada 18 Mei, 2001, dalam kenyataan beramarannya mengakui bahawa dia dan tiga rakannya merancang untuk membunuh Dr. Fernandez. Dua rakannya terbunuh dalam rompakan bank itu.

Pada 26 April 2008, Ketua Polis Negara Tan Sri Musa Hassan menyatakan kes pembunuhan Dr Joe Fernandez ditutup melainkan jika ada saksi dan petunjuk baru. Sepucuk pistol telahpun ditemui dan ujian balistik membuktikan bahawa senjata itu digunakan untuk membunuh Dr. Fernandez, tetapi ia hanya merupakan keterangan forensik sahaja.[2]





Sunday, 8 January 2012

Nik Abduh Nik Aziz -Timbalan Ketua Pemuda PAS



Jawatankuasa Harian Dewan Pemuda PAS Pusat

Sesi 2011-2013

KETUA PEMUDA
: UST NASRUDDIN HASSAN

                                                                

TIMBALAN KETUA PEMUDA
: UST NIK MOHD ABDUH NIK ABDUL AZIZ
NAIB KETUA PEMUDA
: DR RAJA ISKANDAR RAJA YA’ACOB
SETIAUSAHA
: KHAIRUL FAIZI AHMAD KAMIL
PEN. SETIAUSAHA 1
: KAMARUZAMAN MOHAMAD
PEN. SETIAUSAHA 2
: SDR. MOHD NASAIE ISMAIL
PEN. SETIAUSAHA 3
: KHAIRUL FAHMI MAT SOM
BENDAHARI
: Ir HJ MUHD KHAIRIL NIZAM KHIRUDIN
KETUA PENERANGAN
: USTAZ RIDUAN MOHD NOR
PENGARAH PILIHANRAYA
: MOHD SANY HAMZAN
EXCO (Timb. Pengarah Lajnah Mobilisasi Rakyat)
: MOHD ADRAM BIN MUSA
EXCO (Pengarah Lajnah Perpaduan Nasional dan Hubungan NGO)
: UST YUSNI MAT PIAH
EXCO (Timb. Pengarah Lajnah Penerangan & Dakwah)
: YB UST MOHD NOR HAMZAH
EXCO (Jabatan Media Baru & Pendidikan Politik)
: UST AHMAD FADLI BIN SHAARI
EXCO (Lajnah Penyelarasan Mahasiswa Luar Negara)
: UST SYED ABDUL KADIR ALJOOFRE
EXCO
: YB UST MOHD NASIR ZAKARIA
EXCO (Pengarah Lajnah Mobilisasi Rakyat)
: SUHAIZAN KAIAT
EXCO
: YB UST MOHD FIRDAUS JAAFAR
EXCO (Pengarah Kelab Pekerja & Profesional Muda)
: DR SUHAZELI BIN ABDULLAH
Pengarah Jabatan Penerangan
: SDR HELMAN SANUDDIN
Timb. Pengarah Jab. Penyelarasan Mahasiswa Luar Negara
: DR AMINURRASYID BIN YATIBAN (DR AMINUL HADI ABDULLAH)
Pengarah DACS
: ABDUL HALIM BIN AHMAD
Pengarah Strategik Pemuda
: DR. ZUHDI MARSUKI

Al-Qaeda Summit in Kuala Lumpur



                                                       

About a dozen of bin Laden’s trusted followers hold a secret, “top-level al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/2002; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/2002] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA Today, 2/12/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information on to the US (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). Attendees of the summit are said to include:

1.Nawaf Alhazmi and 2. Khalid Almihdhar - The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this summit. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000).

3. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - Mohammed is sometimes referred to as “KSM,” a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995), and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the summit was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence of KSM should have proved the its importance. [Los Angeles Times, 2/2/2002] Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of KSM’s interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading this summit and told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). [Newsweek, 7/9/2003; New York Post, 7/10/2003] Many other media reports identify him there as well. [Independent, 6/6/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/29/2003] For instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed’s presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had photographs of the attack’s mastermind… doing the plotting.” [Newsweek, 7/9/2003]

6. Hambali - An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin [BBC, 8/15/2003] , was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994). [CNN, 3/14/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot at least by 1999 and identified a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/14/2003; CBS News, 8/15/2003] Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident. But the US does not tell them of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after the summit is over (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]

7. Yazid Sufaat - Sufaat is a Malaysian who owned the condominium where the summit was held. [New York Times, 1/31/2002; Newsweek, 6/2/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat’s presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000 (see September-October 2000). Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [Australian, 12/24/2002] Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]


9. Fahad Al-Quso - Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] , will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000), but the FBI will not be given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/2003]

4.Tawfiq bin Attash - Better known by his alias “Khallad,” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of bin Laden’s inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden’s bodyguards, and served as bin Laden’s personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole bombing. [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack. Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995. [US Congress, 9/18/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash’s presence at this summit will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003).

5.Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri - Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaeda’s top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia while 9/11 is being prepared. [Los Angeles Times, 10/10/2001; Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 188; Graham and Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 59] He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans (see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002). He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An al-Qaeda operative had identified a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 152-3] (Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani). [CNN, 12/11/2000; Central Intelligence Agency, 9/6/2006]


8. Ramzi bin al-Shibh - Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him. [Newsweek, 11/26/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Time, 9/15/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] Ulrich Kersten, director of Germany’s federal anticrime agency, the Bundeskriminalamt, will later say, “There are indications that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting.” [New York Times, 8/24/2002] Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/17/2001] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [Associated Press, 9/20/2002] One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh’s presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). [Guardian, 10/15/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Newsweek, 9/4/2002]

10. Ahmad Hikmat Shakir - A suspected al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, Shakir is a greeter at Kuala Lumpur airport. He meets Almihdhar there and travels with him to the apartment where the summit is held. [Associated Press, 10/2/2002; Newsweek, 10/7/2002; Australian, 12/24/2002; Knight Ridder, 6/12/2004] After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they don’t want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).

11. Salem Alhazmi - Alhazmi, a 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi, is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. [Australian, 12/24/2002] US intelligence intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 ]

12. Abu Bara al Taizi - A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, he is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8]

13. Mohamed al-Khatani - A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006).

Others - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. [Cox News Service, 10/21/2001] Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC News, 11/17/2001] However, according to the Wall Street Journal, bin Attash and al-Quso are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may just be a reference to them. [Wall Street Journal, 10/8/2001]







KMM -Nik Abdul Nik Aziz


                                                                
                                                                 
Several names have been linked to the author but one prominent name, based on the writings and picture, was Zainon Ismail, 45. Zainon has been arrested with seven others for alleged involvement in MalaysiaKumpulan Mujahideen (KMM), a local militant religious group with international links, under the Internal Security Act.The eight, aged between 32 and 45, were picked up  in Terengganu, Perak, Kedah and Johor last week.

A former PAS branch committee member, Zainon was involved in raising funds for families of party members who died in the Memali incident but was sacked following a dispute over alleged misappropriation of  funds.In the 1985 incident, 18 people including four  policemen were killed in Memali, Baling, during the  clash of followers of Ibrahim Libya, PAS member, who believed jihad was the only way to topple the  Government.



                                                                        
The ISA detainees were allegedly linked to the murder  of Lunas assemblyman Dr. Joe  Fernandez last year, and also believed to be responsible for bombing a church  and a Hindu temple and the attack on Guar Chempedak  police station on February 4.Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Norian Mai said the seven were Sungai  Benut PAS branch chief Noorashid Sakid, Larut PAS  Youth committee member Ahmad Tajuddin Abu Bakar,  Solihan Abdul Ghafar, Alias Ngah, Abu Bakar Che Dol,  Asfawani Abdullah and Ahmad Pozi Darman.

Nik  Abdul  Nik  Aziz 
The latest arrested we Nik Adli Abdul Aziz, son of Kelantan Menteri Besar Datuk Nik Aziz Nik Mat, and  Mohd Lothfi Ariffin from Kedah. Nik Aziz has admitted  that his 34-year-old son went to Afghanistan to
support the Muslims there in the struggle against the  Russian invasion. Members of the KMM were said to have  received military training and fought in the holy war  in Afghanistan and also in Ambon, Indonesia.

 
The same day PAS President Datuk Fadzil Noor described  the allegations of PAS members being involved in military training in Afghanistan as ild and  serious.Fadzil said the party was surprised that  there was no evidence from the authorities to back their claims. Although the police have claimed that the KMM is responsible for several incidents, it must  now come up with more details of their actions.
                                                                                                         

It is to the advantage of the Home Ministry to release  these details as some are likely to question why such  a preventive action was necessary, instead of charging  them in court. PAS is naturally defensive about any attempt to link the party to such militants but it  cannot be denied that its brand of politics will  attract members of such political inclinations. Many of  those involved would surely support an Islamic state, advocated  by the Islamist party.


                                                              
                                                                   

Initial investigations have shown that the KMM members  were trained to use automatic rifles and rocket launchers an also in assembling homemade bombs. It is understood that the police that the police were investigating the link between the Malaysian mujahideen and those involved in the Southern Bank  robbery in Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya, on May 18.


The robbers included a graduate from the University of  Arkansas and from a university in Karachi, Pakistan.  Following the incident, police picked up another nine  members of the group in June, with arrests in Kedah,  Perak, Selangor and Kuala Lumpur. Most of them were graduates in Islamic studies and business.


Police were also led to a large cache of firearms and ammunition from a hideout of the group in Puchong. The cache included an M16 assault rifle, five magazine clips loaded with 5.56mm ammunition, a revolver and a pistol, home made bombs, several half assembled  home-made-bombs and an assortment of chemicals and  paraphernalia in assembling bombs.


Zin Mahmud, now an Utusan Malaysia journalist, was  working as an editor with Dunia Islam, when he wrote  the foreword in the book. He said many of the Malays  took part in the war in Afghanistan. Providing a  background of the book, Zin said some Malays mati syahid (were martyred) in their participation while  others returned home. The writer, interestingly, wrote  of the contacts he made with mujahid from Egypt, Saudi  Arabia, the Philippines and Pakistan during his Afghan stint.
                                                                        
There will be many skeptics who will challenge the  police to charge the detainees in court, but the same  kind of disbelief also surfaced during the incident in  Sauk involving the Al-Maunah group. But there are plenty of questions which the public want answers to.  They include the involvement of these mujahids  after they returned from Afghanistan, their link with  overseas groups and local political groups as well as the bank robbery.

                                                               



A comprehensive report of the KMM would rebut any charges that the arrests were politically motivated or whether these mujahids, like some former commandos have turned to a life of crime. A White Paper on the
activities of the KMM should eventually be tabled in Parliament to provide the details of the group.

                                                         

Abu Bakar Bashir


Abu Bakar Bashir

The JI was formally founded on January 1, 1993, by JI leaders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar[7] while hiding in Malaysia from the persecution[8] of the Suharto government. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, both men returned to Indonesia[9] where JI gained a terrorist edge when one of its founders, the late Abdullah Sungkar, established contact with Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.[10]


JI’s violent operations began during the communal conflicts in Maluku and Poso.[11] It shifted its attention to targeting US and Western interests in Indonesia and the wider Southeast Asian region[12] since the start of the US-led war on terror. JI’s terror plans in Southeast Asia were exposed when its plot to set off several bombs in Singapore was foiled by the local authorities.


Recruiting, training, indoctrination, financial and operational links between the JI and other militant groups,[13] such as al-Qaeda, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Misuari Renegade/Breakaway Group (MRG/MBG) and the Philippine Rajah Sulaiman movement (RSM) have existed for many years, and continue to this day.[14]


Prior to the first Bali bombing, there was underestimation to the threat Jemaah Islamiah posed[15] Jemaah Islamiah is known to have killed hundreds of civilians in the first Bali car bombing on October 12, 2002. In the attack, suicide bombers killed 202 people and wounded many in two blasts. The first, smaller blast by a suicide bomber using a backpack, killed a small number of people in a nightclub and drove the survivors into the street, where the vast majority were killed by a massive fertilizer/fuel oil bomb concealed in a parked van.


After this attack, the U.S. State Department designated Jemaah Islamiah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Jemaah Islamiah is also strongly suspected of carrying out the 2003 JW Marriott hotel bombing in Kuningan, Jakarta, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing in Jakarta, the 2005 Bali terrorist bombing and the 2009 JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotel bombings.


The Bali and JW Marriott attacks showed that JI did not rule out attacking the same target more than once. The JI also has been directly and indirectly involved in dozens of bombings in the southern Philippines, usually in league with the ASG.


However, most of Jemaah Islamiah prominent figures such as Hambali, Abu Dujana, Azahari Husin, Noordin Top and Dulmatin have either been captured or killed, mostly by Indonesian anti-terrorist squad, Detachment 88. While several of its former leaders, including Malaysian jihadist and Afghanistan War veteran Nasir Abbas, have renounced violence and even assisted the Indonesian and Malaysian governments in the war on terrorism. Nasir Abbas was Noordin Top's former superior.














Hambali




Hambali, an important future al-Qaeda leader, moves to the village of Sungai Manggis, Malaysia, about an hour north of the capital of Kuala Lumpur. Hambali is from nearby Indonesia and fought in Afghanistan with Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s. He starts off poor, working at odd jobs, but soon is frequently traveling and has many overseas visitors. Intriguingly, Hambali’s landlord will later say of Hambali’s visitors, “Some looked Arab and others white.” Hambali plays a major role in the 1995 Bojinka plot in the Philippines (see January 6, 1995), and after that plot is foiled he continues to live in his simple Sungai Manggis house. [Time, 4/1/2002; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002

Living near Hambali in this village are other regional Islamist militant leaders such as Abdullah Sungkar, Imam Samudra (allegedly a key figure in the 2000 Christmas bombings (see December 24-30, 2000) and the 2002 Bali bombings (see October 12, 2002)), Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual leader of the al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah, and Abu Jibril. So many militants live in this village that it becomes known as “Terror HQ” to intelligence agencies. Sungkar and Bashir are considered the two most well-known militant leaders in Southeast Asia at the time (Sungkar dies of old age in 1999). Hambali’s house is directly across from Bashir’s and they are considered friends. [Tempo, 10/29/2002; Ressa, 2003] Interestingly, Fauzi Hasbi, an Indonesian government mole posing as a militant leader, lives next door to Bashir as well. [SBS Dateline, 10/12/2005] Despite his role in the Bojinka plot, Hambali continues to live there very openly. Beginning in March 1995, just two months after the plot was foiled,

Hambali throws his first feast for several hundred guests to mark a Muslim holiday. This becomes an annual party. He also sometimes travels to Indonesia. [Time, 4/1/2002] By May 1999, if not earlier, the FBI connects Hambali to the Bojinka plot (see May 23, 1999). In January 2000, he attends a key al-Qaeda summit in nearby Kuala Lumpur. The CIA gets pictures and video footage of him at the meeting and already has pictures of him from a computer linked to the Bojinka plot (see January 5-8, 2000 and January 5, 2000). However, there is no apparent effort to apprehend him, extradite him, or even put him on a public wanted list. He continues to live in Sungai Manggis until at least late 2000. [Conboy, 2003]

Entity Tags: Fauzi Hasbi, Abu Bakar Bashir, Hambali, Abdullah Sungkar, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Jibril, Imam Samudra


马来西亚飞行员参与基地组织袭击洛杉矶计划

资料图片:位于洛杉矶图书大厦,即现在的美国银行大厦。


  中新网2月11日电 据英国《泰晤士报》报道,东南亚安全官员10日称,一名被“基地”组织招募以驾驶一架被劫持客机撞入美国西海岸最高楼的马来西亚飞行员在意识到这是一项自杀式任务后退出了这一阴谋。
布什总统9日在发表讲演时公布了2002年一起恐怖袭击阴谋的详细“内幕”,他说,9·11恐怖袭击主谋哈立德·谢赫·穆罕默德在9·11发生后一个月就开始策划袭击美国西海岸

的行动,当时阿拉伯裔恐怖分子没有参加对洛杉矶的袭击行动,而是由来自“东南亚的年轻人”实施,因为这样不会引发警方的怀疑。
布什总统称, 劫机者会使用鞋弹炸开飞机的驾驶舱门,控制飞机,而后自杀式撞向洛杉矶的最高建筑——洛杉矶图书大厦(现在的美国银行大厦)。
有“东方拉登”之称的汉巴利当时决定用伊斯兰祈祷团的成员实施袭击行动,这些人员曾在阿富汗受训,会见过本·拉登,他们已开始着手准备袭击行动,但当“基地”组织要犯汉巴利2003年在泰国被捕后,这一恐怖阴谋最终失败。


马来西亚
的反恐专家称,马来西亚工程师、38岁的柴尼是受训发动第二轮恐怖袭击的三名飞行员之一。“基地”组织原计划在“911”发生数个月发动第二波恐怖袭击。柴尼于1999年曾访问过基地组织在阿富汗的营地,他在那里见到了包括基地组织东南亚头目汉巴利在内的一些高级头目。  当他返回马来西亚后,柴尼开始在一所飞行学校注册并获得了小型飞机的驾驶许可证,他随后在
澳大利亚
提出获得驾驶喷气式飞机许可证的申请。官员披露说,“基地”组织从未告诉柴尼他所执行任务的详情。当柴尼看到有关“911”恐怖袭击的报道时,他意识到这是一项自杀式任务,他与武装分子断绝了联系。他随后开始平民生活。由于对他的一名亲属的健康感到担心,他2002年12月向马来西亚当局投降。由于他与伊斯兰祈祷团有联系,他一直在押。伊斯兰祈祷团被视为“基地”组织东南亚的分支。
  一名高级警官称,柴尼告诉他的审讯人员,他没有作好作为烈士死去的准备,所以他撤出了袭击计划。这位警官称,柴尼并不想进行这样的“圣战”,这一袭击计划看起来没有接近实施阶段。  美国国会9·11袭击报告2004年6月首次谈到“第二轮”攻击,报告援引哈立德·谢赫·穆罕默德的供词称,基地组织只招募了三名进行第二轮攻击的飞行员,他们分别是摩萨维、吉迪伊和柴尼。不过,穆罕默德告诉审讯人员,由于过度忙于策划9·11事件,他没有多少时间来策划第二轮攻击。(春风)