Tuesday, 27 March 2012

Yazid Sufaat-Germ Warfare Guru



This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to colleagues, clients or customers, or to license text, images or graphics, use the Reprints tool at the top of any article or visit: Reprints
A Germ Warfare Guru Goes Free
Why did Malaysia release Al Qaeda's bioweapons expert?

by Mark Hosenball | December 16, 2008 7:00 PM EST

A U.S.-trained Al Qaeda microbiologist has been released from jail by the Malaysian government, prompting alarm among American counterterrorism officials.


"This individual is considered dangerous," said one official, referring to the recent decision to free Yazid Sufaat, a notorious Qaeda operative who once oversaw the group's germ-warfare efforts. The official declined to be identified talking about sensitive information.

Safaat had been in Malaysian custody since December 2001, when he was arrested because of his alleged involvement with Jemaah Islamiah, a radical South Asian terror group closely linked with Al Qaeda. But two weeks ago, Malaysia's interior minister, Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, announced that Sufaat and five other detained Islamic militants were being freed because "they are no longer a threat and will no longer pose a threat to public order." Albar added that Sufaat "has been rehabilitated and can return to society."

                                                                  
Malaysia privately informed the Bush administration that its legal authority to detain Sufaat had expired but promised Washington that he would be kept under close observation, the U.S. official indicated. But counterterror officials here expressed doubt that Sufaat has abandoned his radical Qaeda views or his desire to attack the United States with biological weapons. They also point out that Sufaat played an assisting role in planning the 9/11 attacks. He hosted two of the hijackers along with two other veteran Al Qaeda operatives at a terror "summit" in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.

The timing of Sufaat's release was especially awkward for U.S. officials. The Qaeda scientist was freed on Dec. 4—the day after a congressionally mandated commission on weapons of mass destruction released a public report warning of the risk of a biological weapons attack in the next five years.

"There's a troubling irony that this happened the day after our report," said Bob Graham, the former Florida senator and chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who served as co-chairman of the bioweapons panel. (In an interview with NEWSWEEK the day the report was released, Graham said he was particularly concerned about "the degree of risk associated with a biological weapon … The ubiquitous nature of pathogens and the increasing lethality of both natural and synthetic pathogens led our commission to conclude it's more likely that an attack will come biologically rather than nuclear.")

The son of a rubber tapper, Sufaat studied at Malaysia's prestigious Royal Military College and won a scholarship to California State University in Sacramento, where he earned a degree in biological sciences in 1987. Upon returning to Malaysia, he founded a profitable laboratory analysis company. Sometime in the early 1990s—reportedly at the insistence of his wife—he became increasingly devout. He began spending time with militant Islamic teachers and soon became a devoted and committed follower of Jemaah Islamiah and its radical leader, Hambali (he's known by just the one name).

According to the U.S. government's 9/11 Commission report, in January 2000, two of the 9/11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, visited Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital, for what amounted to a planning meeting for the September 2001 attacks. At Hambali's request, Sufaat made his apartment available for the meeting. One of the other participants was Walid bin-Attash, known as Khallad, a Qaeda operative who planned the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. He was later captured and charged as a 9/11 co-conspirator. Khallad told U.S. interrogators that, while staying at Sufaat's apartment, he and Alhazmi talked "about the possibility of hijacking planes and crashing them or holding passengers as hostages."

Later in 2000, Sufaat hosted a visit to Kuala Lumpur by another figure linked to the 9/11 hijackers: Zacharias Moussaoui, the wayward and eccentric would-be terrorist from France who the US government claimed was going to be a 9/11 hijacker. Captured 9/11 participants subsequently said Moussaoui was considered too erratic by Al-Qaeda's leaders to participate in the plot.


The 9/11 Commission report also details Sufaat's efforts to make weapons for Al Qaeda. The terror group's leaders sought Hambali's help in finding a scientist to "take over" Al Qaeda's biological-weapons program. Hambali introduced Sufaat to Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 2001, the report says, Sufaat spent "several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for Al Qaeda in a laboratory" he helped set up near the Kandahar airport in Afghanistan.

The Malaysians's release of Sufaat points up the difficulties the outgoing Bush administration and incoming Obama team face in pressing foreign governments—friendly and not so friendly—to keep Islamic militants off the streets, or at least under close surveillance.

Tags:


©2011 The Newsweek/Daily Beast Company LLC







Friday, 23 March 2012

YAZID SUFAAT: al Qaeda



Skip to comments.


9/11 Families for America ^ | Decmber 11, 2008 | Tim Sumner

Posted on Friday, December 12, 2008 7:04:11 AM by Sergeant Tim

Yazid Sufaat helped Zacharias Moussaoui obtain the visa he used to enter the United States and funded him, housed two 9/11 hijackers while they were en route to the U.S., acquired tons of ammonium nitrate for the Singapore bombing plot, and, in 2001, attempted to obtain Anthrax for al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Now, he is walking around Malaysia a free man.

Reuters, December 10, 2008:


KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (Reuters) — Malaysia has released five men held on suspicion of terrorism, including one who has been linked to the Sept. 11 attacks in the United States, the country’s home minister said Wednesday. Home Minister Syed Hamid Albar, who is in charge of security, said that a man linked to the Jemaah Islamiyah militant network had been freed Thursday, along with two from a Thai separatist group and two Malaysians suspected of working for foreign intelligence groups. Mr. Syed told reporters at Parliament that he believed that Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian who the police suspected had provided lodging for two of the Sept. 11 hijackers, was among them. In 2002, a Malaysian official [all emphasis added in this post mine] said that he doubted that Mr. Yazid knew of Al Qaeda’s plans for Sept. 11.

Los Angelas Times, September 01, 2002:


The CIA asked the Malaysians to monitor the Kuala Lumpur meeting. The Malaysians photographed the men going in and out of the condo. It was not until much later that CIA analysts figured out who the men in the photos were. Atash was determined to have been one of the coordinators of the October 2000 attack in Yemen on the destroyer Cole. Yemeni authorities say Almihdhar also helped prepare the attack. Bin al-Shibh has not been positively identified from the photographs. German police, however, say they have credit card receipts that indicate Bin al-Shibh was in Malaysia at the same time. Sufaat, who has been arrested, told Malaysian officials he allowed the condo to be used at Hambali’s request and had no idea who the men were. He said he does not know whether Hambali attended the meeting but said Hambali has his own key to the condo. ... The meeting occurred in early January 2000, just after a series of planned Al Qaeda millennium attacks failed. Intelligence officials believe the men met to discuss new attacks: the Cole and, given the timing, Sept. 11. On Jan. 8, the men left Kuala Lumpur. On Jan. 15, Almihdhar and Alhazmi arrived in Los Angeles.

Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah - December 2003. by Zachary Abuz, Associate Professor of International Politics at Simmons College, Boston, Massachusetts


Organization of Jemaah Islamiyah To begin, it is important to start with a conceptualization of what JI is. JI was established in 1993 or 1994 by two radical Indonesian clerics, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Bashir) and the late Abdullah Sungkar, who had been living in exile in Malaysia since 1984. They built up a following among radical Malaysians and Indonesian exiles, and were active recruiters for the mujahidin in Afghanistan. Two of their closest associates, Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali) and Mohammed Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibril), both of whom fought in the mujahidinand were recruited into Al Qaeda, were instructed to establish a network of cells across Southeast Asia beginning in 1994. Shortly thereafter, Abdullah Sungkar visited Afghanistan, where he met with Osama bin Laden, and JI was brought into the Al Qaeda fold. ... Al Qaeda and JI officials planned operations together at two important meetings -- the January 2000 meeting in Kuala Lumpur in which the suicide attack on the USS Cole and the September 11 attacks on the United States were planned, and the January 2002 meeting in Bangkok in which Mohammed Mansour Jabarah represented Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in the planning of the Bali bombings. ... some operations were planned and conducted jointly. For example, JI cells in Indonesia and Singapore often planned suicide attacks and were charged with surveillance and bomb-making, but the attacks themselves were to be executed by Al Qaeda operatives from the Middle East. Yet other operations, such as the Bali attack were autonomous. Hambali has confessed that Al Qaeda was so pleased with the attack they sent $100,000 for Hambali to use at his own discretion for future attacks. Finally, Al Qaeda dispatched numerous trainers to camps of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, and JI camps in Indonesia, to train JI members. ... JI’s most important shell and front companies were established by the Malaysian cell. ... These Al Qaeda shell companies were established at a rate of more than one a year between 1993 and 1996. They include two general trading companies, a bio-medical lab, and a computer firm. Most had overlapping board membership.
                                                                    
Green Laboratory Medicine was established in October 1993. Its director was Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army captain who studied bio-chemistry at California State University,graduating in 1987. Upon his return to Malaysia, Sufaat was reproached by his family for his loss of Islamic values while abroad, and he began attending prayer sessions which brought him into contact with Hambali. Sufaat was then sent to Pakistan for religious training, where he was recruited into JI/Al Qaeda. In June 2001 Sufaat traveled to Afghanistan for training from Al Qaeda. He was arrested on December 9, 2001, when he tried to return to Malaysia from Afghanistan. Green Laboratory Medicine was instructed to purchase 21 tons of ammonium nitrate for use in terrorist attacks in Singapore (by way of comparison, the Oklahoma City bombing perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh used two tons of ammonium nitrate). At the time of his arrest, Sufaat had already purchased and dispatched four tons that remained unaccounted for until March 2003.

                                                                         

Hambali has revealed since his arrest in mid August 2003, that Yazid Sufaat and Green Laboratory Medicine also were selected by Al Qaeda “to play a leading role” in the development of chemical and biological weapons for the organization. Sufaat, who was with Hambali in Kandahar, Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 where he was working with Al Qaeda weapons experts, discussed anthrax production in Southeast Asia. As one U.S. intelligence official remarked, “We are very anxious to find out what [Sufaat] knows” about Al Qaeda’s biological and chemical weapons programs. “We think he can answer a lot of those questions.” There is no evidence, however, that Sufaat was able to obtain a virulent strain of Anthrax. ... Ramzi Yousef and Wali Khan Amin Shah established another shell company, the Bermuda Trading Company, in 1994 as a cover to import chemicals for bomb-making. Infocus Technology was established in July 1995, also by Yazid Sufaat. The company was partially owned by his wife. Infocus Technology hired Zacarias Moussaoui, alleged to be the 20th September 11 hijacker, as a marketing consultant and was able to get him a visa to the United States. Infocus was to have paid Moussaoui a lump sum of $35,000 and a monthly stipend of $2,500 to cover his flight training in the United States.

Chapter 5 of the 9/11 Commission Report:


In addition to staging actual terrorist attacks in partnership with al Qaeda, Hambali and JI assisted al Qaeda operatives passing through Kuala Lumpur. One important occasion was in December 1999-January 2000. Hambali accommodated KSM's requests to help several veterans whom KSM had just finished training in Karachi. They included Tawfiq bin Attash, also known as Khallad, who later would help bomb the USS Cole, and future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. Hambali arranged lodging for them and helped them purchase airline tickets for their onward travel. Later that year, Hambali and his crew would provide accommodations and other assistance (including information on flight schools and help in acquiring ammonium nitrate) for Zacarias Moussaoui, an al Qaeda operative sent to Malaysia by Atef and KSM (According to statements attributed to Hambali and Sufaat, in each of these instances the al Qaeda guests were lodged at Sufaat's condominium, an apartment on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur). ... After completing his casing mission, Khallad returned to Kuala Lumpur. Hazmi arrived in Kuala Lumpur soon thereafter and may even have stayed briefly with Khallad and Abu Bara at Endolite. Mihdhar arrived on January 5 [2000], probably one day after Hazmi. All four operatives stayed at the apartment of Yazid Sufaat, the Malaysian JI member who made his home available at Hambali's request.

Wayne Turnbull, July 31, 2003:

Between 1993 and 1996, Sufaat established Green Valley Medicine, Infocus Technology, and Secure Valley. Green Valley Medicine was the front used to purchase and store ammonium nitrate earmarked for the vehicular bombs in Operation JIBRIL [the Singapore bombing plot]. Through Infocus Technology, Sufaat provided support for the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Among the documents seized during the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui was a letter signed by Sufaat stating that Moussaoui was an Infocus Technology marketing representative for the United States. In addition to the letter, Sufaat also provided Moussaoui with US$ 35,000 upfront and an additional US$ 2,500 a month while he was in the United States.












Monday, 9 January 2012

Pembunuhan Dr. Joe Fernandez


Pembunuhan

Pada 4 November 2000, kira-kira pukul 1.30 petang, Dr. Joe yang dalam perjalanan pulang ke rumah dan terperangkap dalam kesesakan jalan raya di persimpangan Jalan Maju dan Jalan Harapan dekat Bukit Mertajam . Kejadian berlaku di di Jalan Maju, Bukit Mertajam ketika dalam perjalanan makan di rumahnya di Taman Bukit , Bukit Mertajam , hanya 500 meter dari klinik beliau.

Dua lelaki bermotosikal telah melepaskan tembakan ke atas kenderaan jenis Nissan Terrano yang dipandu oleh Joe Fernandez dan melarikan diri ke arah Sungai Rambai, Lunas , Kedah.Suspek itu dipercayai pembunuh upahan.Dr. Doshinda Singh memberi rawatan kecemasan dan kemudian membawa mendiang ke Hospital Pakar Bukit Mertajam. Pakar patologi, Datuk Dr. Bupinder Singh mengesahkan mendiang meninggal dunia akibat tembakan tepat di kepala dengan pistol jenis .38. [1]

Arah siasatan semula

Pada 25 April 2008, Mahkamah Koroner Bukit Mertajam ,Koroner M. Mageswari mengarahkan polis membuat siasatan lanjut (open verdict) kerana tiada keputusan yang jelas. Ini kerana mahkamah tidak mengesyaki dan menolak kemungkinan Dr. Joe telah dibunuh akibat masalah perniagaan, politik atau perhubungan peribadi si mati dengan mana-mana pihak.

Ahli kimia dan balistik telah mengesahkan bahawa senjata api yang digunakan dalam rompakan Southern Bank, Petaling Jaya dan pembunuhan Dr. Joe Fernandez adalah senjata api yang sama. Seorang suspek kes rompakan di Southern Bank, Petaling Jaya pada 18 Mei, 2001, dalam kenyataan beramarannya mengakui bahawa dia dan tiga rakannya merancang untuk membunuh Dr. Fernandez. Dua rakannya terbunuh dalam rompakan bank itu.

Pada 26 April 2008, Ketua Polis Negara Tan Sri Musa Hassan menyatakan kes pembunuhan Dr Joe Fernandez ditutup melainkan jika ada saksi dan petunjuk baru. Sepucuk pistol telahpun ditemui dan ujian balistik membuktikan bahawa senjata itu digunakan untuk membunuh Dr. Fernandez, tetapi ia hanya merupakan keterangan forensik sahaja.[2]





Sunday, 8 January 2012

Nik Abduh Nik Aziz -Timbalan Ketua Pemuda PAS



Jawatankuasa Harian Dewan Pemuda PAS Pusat

Sesi 2011-2013

KETUA PEMUDA
: UST NASRUDDIN HASSAN

                                                                

TIMBALAN KETUA PEMUDA
: UST NIK MOHD ABDUH NIK ABDUL AZIZ
NAIB KETUA PEMUDA
: DR RAJA ISKANDAR RAJA YA’ACOB
SETIAUSAHA
: KHAIRUL FAIZI AHMAD KAMIL
PEN. SETIAUSAHA 1
: KAMARUZAMAN MOHAMAD
PEN. SETIAUSAHA 2
: SDR. MOHD NASAIE ISMAIL
PEN. SETIAUSAHA 3
: KHAIRUL FAHMI MAT SOM
BENDAHARI
: Ir HJ MUHD KHAIRIL NIZAM KHIRUDIN
KETUA PENERANGAN
: USTAZ RIDUAN MOHD NOR
PENGARAH PILIHANRAYA
: MOHD SANY HAMZAN
EXCO (Timb. Pengarah Lajnah Mobilisasi Rakyat)
: MOHD ADRAM BIN MUSA
EXCO (Pengarah Lajnah Perpaduan Nasional dan Hubungan NGO)
: UST YUSNI MAT PIAH
EXCO (Timb. Pengarah Lajnah Penerangan & Dakwah)
: YB UST MOHD NOR HAMZAH
EXCO (Jabatan Media Baru & Pendidikan Politik)
: UST AHMAD FADLI BIN SHAARI
EXCO (Lajnah Penyelarasan Mahasiswa Luar Negara)
: UST SYED ABDUL KADIR ALJOOFRE
EXCO
: YB UST MOHD NASIR ZAKARIA
EXCO (Pengarah Lajnah Mobilisasi Rakyat)
: SUHAIZAN KAIAT
EXCO
: YB UST MOHD FIRDAUS JAAFAR
EXCO (Pengarah Kelab Pekerja & Profesional Muda)
: DR SUHAZELI BIN ABDULLAH
Pengarah Jabatan Penerangan
: SDR HELMAN SANUDDIN
Timb. Pengarah Jab. Penyelarasan Mahasiswa Luar Negara
: DR AMINURRASYID BIN YATIBAN (DR AMINUL HADI ABDULLAH)
Pengarah DACS
: ABDUL HALIM BIN AHMAD
Pengarah Strategik Pemuda
: DR. ZUHDI MARSUKI

Al-Qaeda Summit in Kuala Lumpur



                                                       

About a dozen of bin Laden’s trusted followers hold a secret, “top-level al-Qaeda summit” in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. [CNN, 8/30/2002; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/27/2002] Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. [USA Today, 2/12/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian Secret Service monitors the summit and then passes the information on to the US (see January 5-8, 2000 and Shortly After). Attendees of the summit are said to include:

1.Nawaf Alhazmi and 2. Khalid Almihdhar - The CIA and FBI will later miss many opportunities to foil the 9/11 plot through Alhazmi and Almihdhar and the knowledge of their presence at this summit. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the summit begins (see January 2-4, 2000), and tracked Almihdhar as he traveled to it (see January 2-5, 2000).

3. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - Mohammed is sometimes referred to as “KSM,” a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged “mastermind” of the 9/11 attacks. The US has known KSM is an Islamic militant since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in January 1995 (see January 6, 1995), and knows what he looks like. US officials have stated that they only realized the summit was important in the summer of 2001, but the presence of KSM should have proved the its importance. [Los Angeles Times, 2/2/2002] Although the possible presence of KSM at this summit is highly disputed by US officials, one counterterrorism expert will testify before the 9/11 Commission in 2003 that he has access to transcripts of KSM’s interrogations since his capture, and that KSM has admitted leading this summit and told the attendees about a planes as weapons plot targeting the US (see July 9, 2003). [Newsweek, 7/9/2003; New York Post, 7/10/2003] Many other media reports identify him there as well. [Independent, 6/6/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 10/29/2003] For instance, according to Newsweek, “Mohammed’s presence would make the intelligence failure of the CIA even greater. It would mean the agency literally watched as the 9/11 scheme was hatched—and had photographs of the attack’s mastermind… doing the plotting.” [Newsweek, 7/9/2003]

6. Hambali - An Indonesian militant known as Hambali, or Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin [BBC, 8/15/2003] , was heavily involved in the Bojinka plot, an early version of the 9/11 plot (see January 6, 1995 and June 1994). [CNN, 3/14/2002; CNN, 8/30/2002] The FBI was aware of who he was and his connections to the Bojinka plot at least by 1999 and identified a photograph of him by that time (see May 23, 1999). He will be arrested by Thai authorities in August 2003 (see August 12, 2003). [CNN, 8/14/2003; CBS News, 8/15/2003] Malaysian officials recognize Hambali from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident. But the US does not tell them of his Bojinka connections so they will not know to arrest him after the summit is over (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]

7. Yazid Sufaat - Sufaat is a Malaysian who owned the condominium where the summit was held. [New York Times, 1/31/2002; Newsweek, 6/2/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through Sufaat’s presence at this summit is later missed in September 2000 (see September-October 2000). Sufaat will travel to Afghanistan in June 2001 and be arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. [Australian, 12/24/2002] Malaysian officials also recognize Sufaat from summit surveillance photos, as he is a long-time Malaysian resident (see Shortly After January 8, 2000). [New Straits Times, 2/10/2002]


9. Fahad Al-Quso - Al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] , will be arrested by Yemeni authorities in December 2000 (see Late October-Late November 2000), but the FBI will not be given a chance to fully interrogate him before 9/11. He will escape from prison in 2003. [CNN, 5/15/2003]

4.Tawfiq bin Attash - Better known by his alias “Khallad,” Bin Attash, a “trusted member of bin Laden’s inner circle,” was in charge of bin Laden’s bodyguards, and served as bin Laden’s personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole bombing. [Newsweek, 9/20/2001] He is also thought to be a “mastermind” of that attack. Attash is reportedly planning to be one of the hijackers, but will be unable to get a US visa. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8] US intelligence had been aware of his identity as early as 1995. [US Congress, 9/18/2002] A possibility to expose the 9/11 plot through bin Attash’s presence at this summit will later be missed in January 2001 (see January 4, 2001). Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go (see Summer 1999). [Contemporary Southeast Asia, 12/1/2002] He will be captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003 (see April 29, 2003).

5.Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri - Al-Nashiri is one of al-Qaeda’s top field commanders and operates out of Malaysia while 9/11 is being prepared. [Los Angeles Times, 10/10/2001; Gunaratna, 2003, pp. 188; Graham and Nussbaum, 2004, pp. 59] He was involved in an arms smuggling plot (see 1997) and the East African embassy bombings (see August 22-25 1998), in which his cousin was martyred (see 10:35-10:39 a.m., August 7, 1998). He also organized the attack against the USS The Sullivans (see January 3, 2000), and will be involved in the attacks against the USS Cole (see October 12, 2000) and the Limburg (see October 6, 2002). He will be arrested in the United Arab Emirates in November 2002. An al-Qaeda operative had identified a photo of al-Nashiri for the FBI in late 1998 (see August 22-25 1998). [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 152-3] (Note: in the sources al-Nashiri is referred to by two of his aliases: Muhammad Omar al-Harazi and Al Safani). [CNN, 12/11/2000; Central Intelligence Agency, 9/6/2006]


8. Ramzi bin al-Shibh - Investigators believe he wanted to be the twentieth hijacker. His presence at the summit may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite the fact that US intelligence had a picture of him next to bin Attash, and had video footage of him. [Newsweek, 11/26/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Time, 9/15/2002; Die Zeit (Hamburg), 10/1/2002; CNN, 11/7/2002] German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/2002] Ulrich Kersten, director of Germany’s federal anticrime agency, the Bundeskriminalamt, will later say, “There are indications that Ramzi bin al-Shibh was in Kuala Lumpur for the meeting.” [New York Times, 8/24/2002] Another account noting he was photographed at the summit further notes that he entered and left Thailand three times in the first three weeks of January 2000. [Los Angeles Times, 10/17/2001] Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. [Associated Press, 9/20/2002] One account says he is recognized at the time of the summit, which makes it hard to understand why he is not tracked back to Germany and the Hamburg cell with Mohamed Atta and other hijackers. [Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 10/1/2002] Another opportunity to expose the 9/11 plot through bin al-Shibh’s presence at this summit will be missed in June. It appears bin al-Shibh and Almihdhar are directly involved in the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (see Around September 15-16 and October 10-21, 2000). [Guardian, 10/15/2001; Washington Post, 7/14/2002; Newsweek, 9/4/2002]

10. Ahmad Hikmat Shakir - A suspected al-Qaeda agent of Iraqi nationality, Shakir is a greeter at Kuala Lumpur airport. He meets Almihdhar there and travels with him to the apartment where the summit is held. [Associated Press, 10/2/2002; Newsweek, 10/7/2002; Australian, 12/24/2002; Knight Ridder, 6/12/2004] After 9/11, he will be linked to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Bojinka plot. Jordan will arrest him and let him go after the US says they don’t want to take custody of him (see September 17, 2001).

11. Salem Alhazmi - Alhazmi, a 9/11 hijacker and brother of Nawaf Alhazmi, is possibly at the summit, although very few accounts mention it. [Australian, 12/24/2002] US intelligence intercepts from before the summit indicate that he at least had plans to attend. [US Congress, 7/24/2003, pp. 51 ]

12. Abu Bara al Taizi - A Yemeni al-Qaeda agent, he is reportedly meant to be one of the 9/11 hijackers, but will be unable to enter the US due to greater scrutiny for Yemenis. [9/11 Commission, 6/16/2004, pp. 8]

13. Mohamed al-Khatani - A Saudi, he allegedly will confess to attending the summit while being held in the US Guantanamo prison (see July 2002). He apparently will unsuccessfully attempt to enter the US in August 2001 to join the 9/11 plot (see August 4, 2001). However, al-Khatani will later recant his testimony and say he lied to avoid torture (see October 26, 2006).

Others - Unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad are also said to have been at the summit. [Cox News Service, 10/21/2001] Islamic Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in February 1998. [ABC News, 11/17/2001] However, according to the Wall Street Journal, bin Attash and al-Quso are suspected of being Islamic Jihad members at one point, so this may just be a reference to them. [Wall Street Journal, 10/8/2001]







KMM -Nik Abdul Nik Aziz


                                                                
                                                                 
Several names have been linked to the author but one prominent name, based on the writings and picture, was Zainon Ismail, 45. Zainon has been arrested with seven others for alleged involvement in MalaysiaKumpulan Mujahideen (KMM), a local militant religious group with international links, under the Internal Security Act.The eight, aged between 32 and 45, were picked up  in Terengganu, Perak, Kedah and Johor last week.

A former PAS branch committee member, Zainon was involved in raising funds for families of party members who died in the Memali incident but was sacked following a dispute over alleged misappropriation of  funds.In the 1985 incident, 18 people including four  policemen were killed in Memali, Baling, during the  clash of followers of Ibrahim Libya, PAS member, who believed jihad was the only way to topple the  Government.



                                                                        
The ISA detainees were allegedly linked to the murder  of Lunas assemblyman Dr. Joe  Fernandez last year, and also believed to be responsible for bombing a church  and a Hindu temple and the attack on Guar Chempedak  police station on February 4.Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Norian Mai said the seven were Sungai  Benut PAS branch chief Noorashid Sakid, Larut PAS  Youth committee member Ahmad Tajuddin Abu Bakar,  Solihan Abdul Ghafar, Alias Ngah, Abu Bakar Che Dol,  Asfawani Abdullah and Ahmad Pozi Darman.

Nik  Abdul  Nik  Aziz 
The latest arrested we Nik Adli Abdul Aziz, son of Kelantan Menteri Besar Datuk Nik Aziz Nik Mat, and  Mohd Lothfi Ariffin from Kedah. Nik Aziz has admitted  that his 34-year-old son went to Afghanistan to
support the Muslims there in the struggle against the  Russian invasion. Members of the KMM were said to have  received military training and fought in the holy war  in Afghanistan and also in Ambon, Indonesia.

 
The same day PAS President Datuk Fadzil Noor described  the allegations of PAS members being involved in military training in Afghanistan as ild and  serious.Fadzil said the party was surprised that  there was no evidence from the authorities to back their claims. Although the police have claimed that the KMM is responsible for several incidents, it must  now come up with more details of their actions.
                                                                                                         

It is to the advantage of the Home Ministry to release  these details as some are likely to question why such  a preventive action was necessary, instead of charging  them in court. PAS is naturally defensive about any attempt to link the party to such militants but it  cannot be denied that its brand of politics will  attract members of such political inclinations. Many of  those involved would surely support an Islamic state, advocated  by the Islamist party.


                                                              
                                                                   

Initial investigations have shown that the KMM members  were trained to use automatic rifles and rocket launchers an also in assembling homemade bombs. It is understood that the police that the police were investigating the link between the Malaysian mujahideen and those involved in the Southern Bank  robbery in Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya, on May 18.


The robbers included a graduate from the University of  Arkansas and from a university in Karachi, Pakistan.  Following the incident, police picked up another nine  members of the group in June, with arrests in Kedah,  Perak, Selangor and Kuala Lumpur. Most of them were graduates in Islamic studies and business.


Police were also led to a large cache of firearms and ammunition from a hideout of the group in Puchong. The cache included an M16 assault rifle, five magazine clips loaded with 5.56mm ammunition, a revolver and a pistol, home made bombs, several half assembled  home-made-bombs and an assortment of chemicals and  paraphernalia in assembling bombs.


Zin Mahmud, now an Utusan Malaysia journalist, was  working as an editor with Dunia Islam, when he wrote  the foreword in the book. He said many of the Malays  took part in the war in Afghanistan. Providing a  background of the book, Zin said some Malays mati syahid (were martyred) in their participation while  others returned home. The writer, interestingly, wrote  of the contacts he made with mujahid from Egypt, Saudi  Arabia, the Philippines and Pakistan during his Afghan stint.
                                                                        
There will be many skeptics who will challenge the  police to charge the detainees in court, but the same  kind of disbelief also surfaced during the incident in  Sauk involving the Al-Maunah group. But there are plenty of questions which the public want answers to.  They include the involvement of these mujahids  after they returned from Afghanistan, their link with  overseas groups and local political groups as well as the bank robbery.

                                                               



A comprehensive report of the KMM would rebut any charges that the arrests were politically motivated or whether these mujahids, like some former commandos have turned to a life of crime. A White Paper on the
activities of the KMM should eventually be tabled in Parliament to provide the details of the group.